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ABSTRACT 
This paper is among the first to investigate the effect of a prior investment banking 
relationship on merger advisory fees paid by acquiring firms. We find that acquiring firms pay 
a higher fee to advisors when they have had a continuing relationship and a lower fee when 
they switch to an advisor with whom they have had no prior relationship. We develop a 
measure of relationship strength between an acquiring firm and its merger advisor based on 
previous debt, equity and merger transactions completed by the acquiring firm. We also 
examine the relationship between a merger advisor’s reputation and its ability to retain clients. 
We find that firms are more likely to switch if their M and A advisor is not a top tier 
investment bank. To test if higher fees are compensation for better performance, we examine 
differences between the average announcement returns of acquiring firms that switch advisors 
and those that do not.  We find no significant difference between these two return samples.  
Overall, our findings indicate that acquiring firms perceive benefits of retaining merger 
advisors with whom they have had a prior relationship (even at the cost of higher fees) and/or 
they face some other (higher) costs of switching to new bank advisors.  
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1. Introduction  
While previous studies have looked at various factors impacting (cross-sectionally) 
merger advisory fees, little attention has been paid to the inter-temporal relationship among M 
and A advisors and client firms.1 In particular, does a long-term relationship developed 
between an acquiring firm and an advisory firm (e.g. investment bank) result in higher or 
lower M and A fees?2 Further, does a long-term relationship get rewarded in the capital 
market by the acquirer earning higher abnormal returns on a merger announcement compared 
to the case where the acquirer has had no previous relationship with the advisor or has 
switched to a new advisor.  
Using a measure of advisor relationships based on prior transactions completed by a 
client firm with an advisor (henceforth investment bank) we find that: (i) acquiring firms pay 
a higher fee to advisors with whom they have had a long-term relationship and (ii) these 
higher fees are not rewarded by higher abnormal returns for such firms on M and A 
announcements. Overall, these results are consistent the existence of either switching costs 
and/or other benefits arising from continuing investment banking relationships – such as 
better service and derived relationship certification benefits. Indeed, we find that a client is 
more likely to switch when the M and A advisor is not a top tier investment bank (i.e. has a 
lower reputation).  
Section 2 of the paper provides an overview of the merger advisory market and 
describes the sample and variables used. Section 3 describes the hypotheses and empirical 
tests. Section 4 presents a summary and conclusion.  
                                                           
1 Hunter and Walker (1990), McLaughlin (1990, 1992) and Rau (2000) among others.  
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2.1 Overview of the US M and A Market 
 
 The merger advisory market is an important source of revenue for most large 
investment and commercial banks in the United States. In 1998, M and A transactions 
amounted to over $800 billion with merger advising accounting for as much as 40% of the 
total combined revenue obtained from merger advising and public underwriting of some top 
investment and commercial banks (See Table 1). Entry into this market has never been subject 
to significant regulatory barriers. In particular, while the Glass-Steagall Act (prior to 1999) 
inhibited commercial banks’ provision of underwriting services, no such barrier inhibited 
their provision of M and A advisory services.  
 Table 2 provides a list of the top 10 advisors (based on market share) for mergers 
between public companies in the U.S. for each year from 1985 to 1998. First, a striking 
feature is that most of the top 10 advisors are “traditional” investment banks and not 
commercial banks. This changes towards the end of the sample period when J.P. Morgan, 
Chase Manhattan and NationsBank were among the top 10 advisors. Second, there appears to 
be considerable persistence in market share. For example, Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley are in the top 5 throughout the sample period. Third, most of the top merger advisors 
are also top underwriters. Many of the banks listed in Table 2 also have a high ranking in the 
underwriting reputation tables of Carter, Dark and Singh (1998).3  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 James (1992) looks at prior underwriting relationships and investment banking fees while Nanda and Warther 
(1998) and Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2000) study switching behavior in the public issue underwriting 
markets. By contrast, our paper focuses on selection and switching issues in the market for M and A services.  
3 Each year, there was a small fraction of the merger transactions where neither the target nor the acquirer used 
an advisor. However, the vast majority of companies involved in merger transactions use advisors. 
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2.2 Sample selection 
The sample of mergers used for this study were obtained from the Security Data 
Company (SDC) database of mergers and new capital issues. The SDC database has a record 
of new public issues, from 1970, and a record of merger transactions from 1979. We select all 
mergers and tender offers that were successfully completed for which information on total 
advisory fees paid by the acquiring firm were available.4 Importantly, these total fees (as 
defined by SDC) do not include fees paid for any bridge loan financing or fees paid for any 
subsequent debt or equity issues used to finance the merger.5  
We include in our sample those mergers announced and completed over the Jan 1, 
1985 to Oct 1, 1998 period.6 SDC defines a “merger” as a transaction where the acquiring 
firm owned less than 50% of the target before the transaction and owned 100% of the target at 
the end of the transaction.  
Of these mergers, we chose transactions where the acquiring firm had stock price data 
on the CRSP database one month prior to the announcement of the merger transaction. The 
matching with the CRSP database was done using the cusip symbol of the acquiring firm. 
This matching resulted in a sample of 817 mergers. Using this list of cusips, we went back to 
the SDC database and recorded all debt, equity and merger transactions that were completed 
by the acquiring firm in the four years prior to the merger transaction. These data were used to 
establish measures of relationship strength between the M and A acquirers and their advisors. 
                                                           
4 Henceforth, we shall collectively refer to mergers and tender offers as mergers.  
5 We excluded target firms for the very reason that we are concerned about the effects of long-term relationships 
and M and A fees and targets cease to exist on an M and A completion. We also excluded LBO’s from the 
sample.  
6 The reason for starting in 1985 (and not 1979, which is the year that the merger database starts) is as follows: 
To properly calculate the measure of relationship strength, one needs data on all prior debt, equity and merger 
transactions. Since merger data begins only from 1979, the earliest we can begin is 1983. However, the 
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Specifically, we define prior relationships to include prior debt and equity underwriting for 
the acquiring firms as well as provision of M and A services within a time period of four 
years before the announcement date of the transaction.7 This resulted in 656 mergers for 
which the acquiring firm had at least one transaction in the four years preceding the 
announcement date of the merger. Of these, there were 45 transactions where the only role of 
the advisor was to provide a fairness opinion. Since this is a relatively minor role (see 
McLaughlin (1992)), we exclude these transactions. The resulting sample of 611 transactions 
formed our base sample. Company specific data were obtained using the SDC database and 
the CRSP database. Due to the long time period over which this study extends, we convert all 
nominal dollar values into real values for the year 1998 using the chain weighted GDP 
deflator.8  
 We employ the log of total fees (total compensation for advisory services) as well as 
total fees paid as a percentage of transaction value as alternative measures of the dependent 
variable.  
 
2.3 Construction of Reputation and Relationship measures 
Table 3 describes the variables used in the empirical analysis in Sections 3 and 4. In 
this sub-section, we describe in detail the construction of the variables used to proxy for M 
and A advisor reputation, relationships and switching. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
robustness checks of the relationship strength measure use up to 6 years of data on prior merger transactions. 
This implies that the earliest we can start is 1985. In any case, availability of fee data in this period is sparse.  
7 There is nothing sacrosanct about this time period. In one of the robustness checks, we define relationships 
based on shorter and longer time periods. These do not alter the results. The choice of four years was dictated by 
balancing sample size (short duration implies fewer companies would satisfy the requirement of having a 
transaction within the time period) versus relationship continuity (how much of a relationship do you really have 
if you have had no transactions in many years?)  
8 The results change very little if nominal values are used. 
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2.3.1 Reputation of Advisor  
We use the tier of an advisor, based on its market share of total M and A transactions 
as the proxy for reputation. Market share of an advisor in any given year is defined as the ratio 
of the total dollar value of all successful mergers in that year where the given advisor was 
retained by the acquiring firm to the total dollar value of all successful mergers in the same 
year. In merger transactions where more than one advisor was retained, all advisors are given 
full credit for the deal.  
In the event of a merger between two advisors (banks), the market share of the 
combined entity is set equal to the sum of the market shares of the two individual banks. For 
example, in the computation of market share of Bankers Trust (BT) and Wolfensohn after 
their 1996 merger, the market share of BT Wolfensohn in the year subsequent to the 
completion of their merger would be the sum of the market shares of BT and Wolfensohn in 
the previous year.   
 The market share of a bank (lagged by one year) is used to classify each advisor into 
one of three possible reputational tiers. Banks that rank from 1 through 5 (i.e. in the top 5) are 
classified as top tier, banks that rank from 6 through 20 are classified as middle tier, and 
banks below this are classified as bottom tier.  For transactions where multiple advisors were 
retained, the tier of the advisor with the largest market share is used in the empirical analysis.9 
2.3.2 Relationship Strength 
One needs to identify a reasonable time frame for the measurement of relationships. 
As described above, the relationship time frame is chosen as four years. Thus, all references 
                                                           
9 Use of market share as a proxy for reputation is justified by Megginson and Weiss (1991). They document that 
reputation measures based on market share have a high correlation with the ranking of Carter and Manaster 
(1990). 
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to prior transactions in this paper should be read as transactions completed by the acquiring 
firm in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger transaction. Krigman, Shaw 
and Womack (2000) use a three-year time period for studying underwriting relationships and 
Nanda and Warther (1998) use a five-year time period for measuring underwriting 
relationships. In robustness checks of our results, we varied the time period used to define 
relationships with little effect on the regression results.  
Relationship strength is thus defined as the ratio of two values. The denominator is the 
total dollar value of all transactions of debt, equity and mergers completed by the acquiring 
firm over the past four years.10 The numerator is calculated as the sum of the following. The 
merger advisor is given full credit (in $ terms) for any capital raising issue where it was 
retained as a lead manager by the acquiring firm, and any prior mergers where it was retained 
in an advisory capacity over the previous four years. For any public issue where the given 
merger advisor was retained as a manager, but not as the lead manager, it is given 50% of the 
credit (in $ terms).11 This relationship strength measure will always lie between zero and one. 
A value of one indicates the strongest possible relationship and a value of zero indicates no 
relationship. The bank that has the highest relationship strength with the acquiring firm is 
defined as its lead bank.12 
                                                           
10 The current merger transaction is excluded in all calculations of relationship strength.  
11 Let us clarify this with an example. Let an acquiring firm have 3 prior transactions in the four years prior to 
the announcement of the merger. Two are debt issues for $100 million each and one is a merger transaction for $ 
25 million. The merger advisor retained in the current transaction was retained as the lead manager in one debt 
issue, a manager (but not lead) in one issue and was retained as the merger advisor in the prior merger 
transaction. Then, the relationship strength measure would be (100 (lead in debt) + 50 (not lead in debt) + 25)/ 
225 = 0.78. 
12 An alternate way to define relationship strength is to use only banks that were retained as lead managers. If we 
use this definition, the definition of the lead bank changes only in 18 out of the 611 cases. Thus, the identity of 
the lead bank is quite robust to changes in the strength measure. 
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A bank that gets a higher fraction of the total amount of business that a given client 
firm generates will have a higher value of relationship strength than other banks that get a 
lower fraction. Holding the total amount of business constant, the bank with higher 
relationship strength has a higher level of relationship interaction with the client firm.13  
2.2.3 Switching of Advisors 
 Finally, with respect to a firm switching advisors, a firm is said to have switched if it 
chooses a merger advisor who it has not retained in any capacity i.e. in any of its prior debt, 
equity or merger transactions at any time in the prior four years.14 
 
3.1 Summary statistics 
Figures 1 and 2 graphically depict the variation of percentage fees and the log of the 
total fee (in $ million) with the log of the transaction value (in $ million). Note that there is a 
fairly large variation in fees charged, both in absolute and percentage terms for transactions of 
all sizes. For example, there does not appear to be the type of clustering of fees at a particular 
percentage fee akin to that obtained in the IPO underwriting market (i.e. 7%) by Chen and 
Ritter (2000).  
Table 4 Panel A shows some descriptive statistics for this sample. The average fee for 
the entire time period is $3.94 million and the average transaction value is $1.37 billion. 
Firms switched to a new M and A advisor with whom they had no relationship (in the past 
four years) 32% of the time. This figure is similar to that obtained by Krigman, Shaw and 
                                                           
13 As with the market share variable, the relationship strength variable also accounts for mergers among banks. 
Thus, an acquiring firm that had a relationship with either Bankers Trust or Wolfensohn prior to their merger 
would be classified as having a relationship with BT Wolfensohn in years subsequent to the merger between BT 
and Wolfensohn. We avoid double counting to ensure that the relationship strength measure is always less than 
or equal to 1. 
14 A bank that was not a lead manager but a manager in an underwriting was assumed to have had a relationship.  
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Womack (2000) and James (1992) for underwriting relationships. The incidence of switching 
does not appear to have increased significantly over this time period. Further, firms' 
relationship strength with their advisors does not exhibit any striking trend over time. Average 
relationship strength (see Section 2.3.2) for firms that do not switch lies between 0.6 and 0.7 
for most years.  
Average percentage fees are 0.70%. In contrast to the reduction of underwriting 
spreads for debt issues documented by Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999), percentage fees for 
merger advisory services do not show any reduction over time.  
Table 4 Panel B compares the effect of tier of the advisor and switching on total fees 
paid, percentage fees paid, and the size of the acquiring firm. From column 1, we can see that 
switching has a strong effect on fees paid. Acquiring firms that switch pay an average fee of 
$3.44 million while those that do not pay an average fee of $4.18 million. However, 
transactions where acquiring firms switch are smaller in size than transactions where they do 
not. The average transaction size for acquiring firms that switch is $1.25 billion. The 
corresponding value for firms that do not switch is $1.42 billion. Thus, percentage fees do not 
show any such reduction. In fact, percentage fees actually increase for clients that switch (71 
basis points versus 70 basis points). This is not surprising given the strong negative 
correlation between percentage fees and transaction size.  
Next, the data are divided based on the number of prior transactions that the acquiring 
firm had. Since we choose a four-year time frame for measurement of relationships and 
transactions, it is reasonable to classify firms with four or more transactions in four years (i.e. 
one or more per year) as frequent transactors and those with less than four transactions as 
infrequent transactors. Out of the 611 transactions, 223 transactions involved acquiring firms 
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that were frequent transactors and the remaining 388 transactions involved acquiring firms 
that were infrequent transactors. These two sets of firms appear to be quite different in terms 
of transaction value, size of acquiring firm and total fees paid. The average fee for infrequent 
transactors is $2.74 million while that for frequent transactors is $6.04 million. The average 
market value of acquiring firms that are infrequent transactors is about $1.5 billion while it is 
$6.7 billion for frequent transactors.  
Acquiring firms that choose bottom tier advisors are also much smaller, in terms of 
market capitalization, than acquiring firms that choose middle tier advisors or top tier 
advisors. Also, average transaction size decreases as we go from top tier advisors to bottom 
tier advisors. These results seem to suggest (not surprisingly) that there is an M and A market 
segmentation with larger firms primarily choosing top and middle tier advisors and smaller 
firms choosing bottom tier advisors.  
Panel 4C presents cross-tabulations of various qualitative variables of interest. The 
results in the first part of this panel suggest that we can reject the hypothesis that the tier of 
the advisor is independent of the transaction frequency. Infrequent transactors choose bottom 
tier banks with a higher probability than frequent transactors. The second part of this panel 
reveals that switching is also dependent on whether or not the acquiring firm is a frequent 
transactors. Frequent transactors switch less (51 out of 223 times) relative to infrequent 
transactors (146 out of 388 times) consistent with the importance of long-term relationship 
effects among frequent transactors and their principal advisors.  
3.2 Multivariate tests  
 Tables 5A and B show the results of OLS regressions of log of the total merger 
advisory fees (Table 5A) and the merger fee percent (Table 5B) on different transaction 
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characteristics. All OLS estimates include the White correction for heteroscedasticity. The 
OLS models were first estimated without any fixed effects and then with fixed effects for the 
year of the merger announcement and industry classification of the target based on its two 
digit SIC code. Likelihood ratio tests comparing models with and without fixed effects, 
suggest that the fixed effects model has a greater explanatory power than the model without 
fixed effects (at the 1% level of significance). Therefore, fixed effect dummy variables for 
industry and year of announcement are included in all regressions.15  
In what follows, we concentrate on the level of fee results since in virtually all cases, 
the percentage fees results are consistent with those found using the levels. Moreover, 
McLaughlin (1992) also concentrated on explaining fee levels. The fit of the regression model 
in Table 5A is reasonably good with an R2 of about 72%. The coefficient of the log of the 
transaction value is positive and significant indicating that larger transactions have higher fees 
in absolute terms. The duration of time (in months) between the announcement date of a 
merger and the completion date also has a positive effect on fees paid. Similarly, the tender 
offer dummy has a positive effect on fees paid. However, the dummy for a hostile deal is not 
statistically significant. The number of advisors retained has a positive effect on fees while 
dummy variables for top and middle tier advisors are highly significant and positive. Many of 
these empirical results corroborate earlier work done by Mclaughlin (1992) and Hunter and 
Walker (1990).   
 With respect to relationships and switching which is the major focus of this paper, 
Model 1 in Table 5A suggests that switching (proxied by a switching dummy) reduces the 
level of fees by about 22% and percentage fees (Table 5B) by about 13%. This implies a 
                                                           
15 The main results are all robust to exclusion of the fixed effect variables.  
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significant loyalty premium is paid by firms that retain the same M and A advisor over time. 
As noted earlier, this result is consistent with either considerable other relationship benefits 
accruing to a firm from retaining the same M and A advisor (e.g. service efficiency) and/or a 
material financial cost of switching advisors other than fees paid.    
McLaughlin (1992) found that the reputation of an M and A advisor had a strong 
effect on total fees paid. The univariate results presented earlier confirmed this finding. It is 
interesting to examine whether the fee benefits of switching vary across the tier or quality of 
the advisor. To examine this, the switching dummy is interacted with the tier of the advisor 
(Model 2) in Tables 5A and B. The magnitudes of the coefficients clearly increase as we go 
from top tier advisors to bottom tier advisors indicating that bottom tier advisors are willing to 
give a larger fee discount to firms that switch.  
Finally, Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2000) found that firms are more likely to 
switch (for underwriting their seasoned equity offering) to top tier banks if the bank they used 
at the time of their IPO was not a top tier bank. To further explore this result, we classify 
firms that switch into three categories – (1) Those that switch to a bank that has the same tier 
as their current lead bank (lateral switches). (2) Those that switch to a bank that has a higher 
tier than their current lead bank (upward switches). (3) Those that switch to a bank that has a 
lower tier than their current lead bank (downward switches). We then compute the fee 
regressions replacing the single switch dummy with the three switch variables – lateral, 
upward and downward. The results (Model 3 in Tables 5A and B) indicate that firms that 
switch downwards appear to get the maximum fee benefit or reduction, while those that 
switch upwards get the least fee reduction.  
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However, the previous results may be biased if the decision to switch is related to any 
of the independent variables in the OLS regression. The idea can be illustrated by the 
following example: Say one is able to observe the actual net benefit (cost) of switching or a 
proxy for this. Denote this by NB. Then, NB as an independent variable in the regression 
using OLS would capture the marginal effect of the net benefit on fees charged. The problem 
however is that NB is not observed. Rather, we only observe the actual decision to switch (a 
dichotomous variable) that is clearly determined by the underlying latent variable NB. In this 
case, Heckman (1979) has shown that the OLS estimates of the coefficient of switching may 
be biased.  
To account for this effect, one can use the two-stage least squares technique suggested 
by Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981) to adjust the coefficient estimates and their standard 
errors. The method involves estimation of a probit model with the switching dummy as the 
dependent variable. Next, a function of the fitted values of the probability of switching from 
the first stage probit model is used in a second stage maximum likelihood estimation. We 
implement this approach using the LIMDEP 7.1 software. 
Potentially, transaction and advisor characteristics could have an effect on switching. 
The probability of switching could also depend on the industry that the target operates in and 
the year of announcement of the merger (Whether the merger took place during a merger 
boom or not, etc.). To account for all of these effects, we include all of these variables in the 
probit estimation model. 16 
                                                           
16 The method is different in that standard 2SLS used to estimate a system of equations (say supply-demand) 
which are simultaneously determined. Here, the estimator adjusts for the dependence of other independent 
variables on the switch dummy. The first stage regression (the probit model) is used to adjust for the dependence 
of the switch dummy on other independent variables. Therefore, all independent variables can be used in the 
probit model. If this were a conventional 2SLS, this should not be done, and such a model cannot be estimated.   
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These results are shown in Table 6A for fee levels and 6B for percentage fees. Again 
we concentrate the discussion on the fee level regression. The first column in Table 6A 
displays the results of the first stage (probit model) of the Heckman correction regression. 
Firms are more likely to switch in tender offers. Consistent with the results in Krigman, Shaw 
and Womack (2000), firms are also more likely to switch if their lead bank is not a top tier 
advisor. Frequent transactors are less likely to switch to an unrelated bank. The second 
column of Table 6A displays the results for the second stage of the Heckman correction 
regression. The coefficient on the Mill’s ratio indicates the significance of this switching 
dummy. The main result in Tables 6A and B is that switching continues to reduce fees 
significantly.  
While the above results suggest that there may be direct benefits from switching, those 
firms that do not must perceive direct and indirect benefits from retaining existing 
relationships. Indeed, an important issue that can be examined is whether these firms that 
maintain long-term relationships directly benefit through lower fees. That is, does relationship 
strength (as measured in this paper -- see Section 2.3.2) have a negative effect on the M and A 
fees paid by the subset of firms that do not switch. If no such direct relationship can be found, 
it is consistent with relationships providing indirect benefits to firms (i.e. benefits not 
reflected in lower fees).  
Tables 7A Model 1 (for fee levels) and 7B Model 1 (for fee percentage) show that 
there is no significant effect of relationship strength (for non-switchers) on M and A fees. 
Indeed, the coefficient signs are positive but insignificant at the 10% level. Moreover, even 
for frequent transactors who don’t switch (Model 2 Tables 7A and B), the relationship is 
insignificant. Finally, Model 3 Tables 7A and 7B examines whether relationship strength is 
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more important for firms that use lower tier advisors, i.e., perhaps lower tier advisors are 
willing to lower fees for non-switchers that have a strong relationship with them. Again, while 
the coefficients for relationship strength interacted with the advisor tier dummy suggest lower 
fees for firms loyal to lower tier advisors, the coefficients remain statistically insignificant.  
3.3 Robustness Checks 
 Tables 8A and B present some robustness checks of these results. Inclusion of 
transactions where the acquiring firm had no prior M and A or debt or equity transactions 
does not affect the results of a fee reduction from switching. Likewise, inclusion of 
transactions where the only role of the advisor was to provide a fairness opinion did not alter 
the switching results. Interestingly, the no transaction dummy is negative in both cases and 
significant in the model that includes fairness opinions indicating that banks may give a fee 
reduction to establish a new relationship with a firm they had no prior relationship with. 
Moreover, if we define relationship strength using only lead engagements, then this measure 
has a positive significant effect on fees. Thus, our primary findings, i.e., presence of a 
switching fee discount (or reduction) and no reduction in fee for a continuing relationship, 
appear to be robust to different specifications.  
3.4 M and A Advisors, Relationships and Abnormal Returns 
 So far, the analysis has focused on the costs or benefits of an investment banking 
relationship purely in terms of the fees paid. Clearly, clients could get “indirect” benefits of 
relationships that are not related to fees. These include (but are not limited to) better quality of 
service during the merger negotiations, better bargaining with targets, obtaining other services 
between transactions, etc. Unfortunately, data limitations preclude measurement of many such 
“indirect” benefits. One possible indirect benefit that is easier to measure is the announcement 
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return to the client firm. Specifically, clients that use a relationship bank with experience and 
knowledge of the client as its M and A advisor may provide a more credible signal to the 
financial markets as to the value-added of a proposed merger transaction than a client who 
hires, as an M and A advisor, a bank with no previous track record with that client. That is, 
relationship based M and A advisors may provide valuable “certification” benefits to their 
clients.17 To evaluate these potential certification effects, we calculate abnormal returns for 
the acquiring firm using a 11-day window [days (-5,0,+5)] around the announcement date of 
the merger.18  
Table 9 presents results for univariate tests of the relation between switching and 
abnormal returns. We classify merger transactions in the sample into those that had positive 
abnormal returns on the announcement date and those that had negative abnormal returns. We 
conduct a χ2 of independence between switching and the sign of the abnormal return. We find 
that these two are independent at conventional levels of significance. The mean abnormal 
returns present a similar picture. The mean abnormal return for firms that switch is –0.47% 
and for those that do not is –0.99%. These two values do not differ significantly from each 
                                                           
17 Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter (1997) and others have found that firms that retain an investment bank with 
whom they had a prior commercial banking relationship for their debt issues get a higher price for their bonds. 
Similarly, James and Weir (1990) find that IPO’s of firms that had a pre-existing commercial banking 
relationship are underpriced much less than IPO’s of firms that did not have any pre-existing commercial 
banking relationship.  
18 Sufficient data was not available to estimate the market model for all the acquiring firms. Those firms with 
less than 240 valid returns in days (-300,-60) are excluded from this analysis. Day 0 is the announcement date of 
the merger. 
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other at conventional levels of significance. Therefore, the higher M and A fees charged by 
relationship banks do not appear to be compensation for a higher announcement returns to the 
acquiring firms’ stockholders.  
4. Summary and Conclusions 
 This study examined the effects of investment banking relationships on M and A 
advisory fees paid by acquiring firms. We find acquiring firms pay higher fees when they 
choose a bank with whom they have had a continuing relationship and lower fees when they 
switch. We find evidence that indicates that reputation of a merger advisor also plays a role in 
the setting of fees. We developed a measure of the strength of the relationship between an 
acquiring firm and its merger advisor. Using this variable, we could find no evidence of a 
relationship discount, i.e. that non-switching firms with long term relationships paid lower M 
and A fees.  These findings are consistent with potential indirect benefits arising from 
maintaining relationships in the M and A market. Examination of merger announcement 
returns however, indicated no significant difference between acquiring firms that did not 
switch and those that did. This suggests that acquiring firms accrue some other non-fee related 
benefits from retaining inside or relationship banks and/or face some other non-pecuniary 
costs of switching to outside banks. 
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This table shows the revenues obtained in 1998 by top commercial and investment banks from underwriting
public securities and from merger advising. In calculating fee revenue for public security issues, it is assumed that
the lead underwriter earns the entire underwriting spread. 
Investment Bank Fee revenue from Fee Revenue Fee Revenue Percentage of 
public corporate from public from merger Revenue from 
debt underwriting equity advice merger advice 
(in $ million) underwriting (in $ mllion) relative to total 
(in $ million) revenue from 
public underwriting
and merger advice
Morgan Stanley 556.5 697.3 302.9 19.5%
Goldman Sachs 502.6 585.2 531.2 32.8%
Merrill Lynch 869.3 627.6 321.3 17.7%
Credit Suisse First Boston 183.2 202.8 287.4 42.7%
DLJ 188.9 302.9 200.0 28.9%
Citibank 540.0 373.2 189.1 17.2%
Lehman 343.2 173.1 199.2 27.8%
J.P. Morgan 210.9 148.0 70.9 16.5%
Bankers Trust 60.7 191.5 56.9 18.4%
NationsBank Montgomery 38.0 94.7 26.2 16.5%
Average (for this sample) 349.3 339.6 218.5 23.8%
Total (for this sample) 3,493.3 3,396.3 2,185.1
Source: Security Data Company
 Fee Revenue from underwriting and M&A transactions 
Table 1
This table shows the rank of any advisor that was in the top 10 (in terms of market share) in any year between 1985 and 1998. In years where the
advisor's rank is below 10, the corresponding table entry is blank. Market share is defined as the total dollar value of mergers and acquisitions where
the given advisor was retained by the acquiring firm to the total dollar value of all mergers and acquisitions in a given calender year. For mergers
where more than one advisor is retained, all advisors are given full credit for the transaction. This table gives credit to the actual subsidiary of the
investment or commercial bank that was retained as an advisor and not the parent company.
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Goldman Sachs & Co 1 1 2 3 4 1 4 1 2 3 2 3 2 1
First Boston Corp 2 3 1 4 8 7 2 5
Morgan Stanley & Co 3 4 4 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 4
Lazard Freres & Co LLC 4 7 7 5 1 9 9 5 6
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 5 8 7 6 3 8 3 5 2 6 1 3 2
Drexel Burnham Lambert 6 10 6 6
Lehman Brothers 7 6 3 1 1 5 7 6 6 5 8
Dillon, Read & Co Inc 8 9 4 6 6
Kidder Peabody & Co Inc 9 8 8 9 7 4
Salomon Brothers
(Salomon Smith Barney 1998)
PaineWebber 5 6
James D Wolfensohn Inc 9 8 4
Bear Stearns & Co Inc 9 10 8 10 3 7 9
Prudential-Bache Capital Fund 10
Stephens Inc 9
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenerette 10 9 10 6
Wasserstein Perella Group Inc 2
Alpine Capital Group 7
Furman Selz Mager Dietz Birney 8
Alex Brown & Sons Inc 10
Robinson-Humphrey (Old) 7
Hellman & Friedman 10
Source: Security Data Company
3 410 2 5 5 4 3
Table 2 - Ranking of advisors on market share
4 8 410 5
This table shows the rank of any advisor that was in the top 10 (in terms of market share) in any year between 1985 and 1998. In years where the
advisor's rank is below 10, the corresponding table entry is blank. Market share is defined as the total dollar value of mergers and acquisitions where
the given advisor was retained by the acquiring firm to the total dollar value of all mergers and acquisitions in a given calender year. For mergers
where more than one advisor is retained, all advisors are given full credit for the transaction. This table gives credit to the actual subsidiary of the
investment or commercial bank that was retained as an advisor and not the parent company.
Bankers Trust Co 9
Smith Barney Shearson 6 8
JP Morgan & Co Inc 10 10 8 8 7
Gleacher & Co 5
Credit Suisse First Boston 7 5 9 7 5
Allen & Co Inc 7
Chase Manhattan Corp 9
Montgomery Securities 8
NationsBanc Montgomery Sec 10
Source: Security Data Company
Table 2 - Ranking of advisors on market share (continued)
Variable used Description
Log of total merger fees Log of the absolute fee in $ millions.
Fee percentage Absolute fees expressed as a percentage of the transaction value.
Log transaction value Log of transaction value which is the total consideration offered to the target in $ million. For mergers
involving stock, the stock was valued at the price one day before the announcement date of the merger.
Duration Months from the first public announcement date of the merger transaction to completion date.
Number of advisors Variable equal to the number of advisors retained by the acquiring firm for the given merger.
Tender offer dummy Dummy set to 1 if the merger was also associated with a tender offer
Hostile bid dummy Dummy set to 1 if the merger was a hostile bid
Switch Dummy set to 1 if the given advisor had not been retained by the acquiring firm in any of its prior 
debt, equity or merger transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger.
Relationship strength This is computed by taking the ratio of the total dollar value of issues of debt and equity in which the
 merger advisor was the lead manager, half of the dollar value of issues in which the advisor was not lead
manager, but was a manager, and the dollar value of previous merger transactions in which the given 
advisor was retained by the acquiring firm to the total dollar value of all debt, equity and merger 
transactions by the firm in the previous four years. This measure will always be between 0 and 1. 
When a firm switches, relationship strength will be (by definition) equal to zero. In case of mergers between
two merger advisors, all firms that had a relationship with either merger advisor are considered to have a 
relationship with the combined entity. See footnote 11 for an example. 
Lead bank of acquiring firm The bank that had the highest relationship strength with the acquiring firm.
        
Table 3: Description of variables
This table provides a list of all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Variable Used Description
Market Share of advisor The ratio of the total $ value of transactions where any acquiring firm retained the given merger advisor in an advisory 
capacity in a given year to the total $ value of all mergers in that year.
Top tier advisor dummy Dummy set to 1 if the investment bank ranked 1-5 in M&A market share computation in the calendar year prior to the
announcement of the merger.
Medium tier advisor dummy Dummy set to 1 if the investment bank ranked 6-20 in M&A market share computation in the calendar year prior to the
announcement of the merger.
Tier of advisor Integer variable that takes a value of 0 if the advisor retained by the acquiring firm was a top tier bank,
1 if the advisor retained was a middle tier bank and 2 if the advisor retained was a bottom tier bank. 
Tier of lead bank Integer variable that takes a value of 0 if the lead bank of the acquiring firm was a top tier bank,
1 if the lead bank was a middle tier bank and 2 if the lead bank was a bottom tier bank. 
Market Value of the acquiring firm Market value of equity of the acquirer one month prior to the announcement date of the merger.
Number of Transactions Total Number of capital market transactions (debt, equity or mergers) completed by the acquiring firm in the four
years prior to the announcement of the merger. 
Frequent transactor An acquiring firm that had four or more transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger. 
Infrequent transactor An acquiring firm that had less than four transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger. 
Downward switch Dummy set to 1 when the acquiring firm switched to a merger advisor that had a lower tier than its previous lead bank. 
Upward switch Dummy set to 1 when the acquiring firm switched to a merger advisor that had a higher tier than its previous lead bank. 
Lateral switch Dummy set to 1 when the acquiring firm switched to a merger advisor that had the same tier as its previous lead bank. 
Table 3: Description of variables (continued)
 Figure 1: Percentage fees vs log of Transaction Value
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This panel shows summary statistics for the sample used for empirical analysis in this paper. All absolute dollar values are converted into 1998 dollars
using the chain weighted GDP deflator. See Table 3 and Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 for a desciption of the variables. 
Year Total Fees Percentage Transaction Market Value of Number Percentage of Relationship Number of
(in $ million) fees Value Acquiring firm of transactions transactions where strength Observations
(in $ million) (in $ million) where firms switched firms switched (for subset of firms 
that did not switch)
All years 3.94 0.70 1370 3383 197 32% 0.67 611
1985 7.87 0.35 3481 3823 1 9% 0.62 11
1986 3.64 0.75 923 1949 13 35% 0.67 37
1987 3.09 0.47 822 2839 8 24% 0.65 33
1988 3.95 0.72 1452 7177 8 31% 0.60 26
1989 7.24 0.66 2306 2853 7 29% 0.74 24
1990 3.32 0.57 1157 2865 3 33% 0.61 9
1991 3.64 0.77 853 1854 5 29% 0.62 17
1992 1.96 0.84 482 1052 13 54% 0.64 24
1993 2.06 0.71 824 1392 4 11% 0.70 37
1994 2.51 0.70 629 1471 18 38% 0.59 47
1995 3.48 0.76 1245 3140 27 36% 0.71 74
1996 3.61 0.66 1052 5670 20 29% 0.66 70
1997 4.36 0.72 1373 3302 34 33% 0.70 103
1998 5.23 0.73 2431 4355 36 36% 0.66 99
Table 4 Panel A - Summary Statistics
Panel B makes univariate comparisons of total fees, percentage fees, transaction value, market value of the acquiring firm with respect to three
qualitative variables - (1) transactions where acquiring firms switched and where they did not (2) transactions where the acquiring firms were frequent
transactors (had 4 or more transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger) and transactions where the acquiring firms were
infrequent transactors (had less than four transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger) (3) transactions where the
acquiring firms chose top, middle and bottom tier advisors. 
Total Fees Percentage Transaction Market Value of Number of
(in $ million) fees (%) Value Acquiring firm Observations
(in $ million) (in $ million)
Acquiring firms that did not switch 4.18 0.70 1,426 3,460 414
Acquiring firms that switched 3.44 0.71 1,253 3,221 197
Acquiring firms were infrequent transactors 2.74 0.79 609 1,475 388
Acquiring firms were frequent transactors 6.04 0.54 2,694 6,703 223
Acquiring firms that chose top tier advisors 5.82 0.65 2,155 4,312 200
Acquiring firms that chose middle tier advisors 4.17 0.66 1,350 4,069 232
Acquiring firms that chose bottom tier advisors 1.55 0.82 519 1,454 179
Table 4 Panel B- Univariate comparisons
Panel C presents cross tabulation results between tier of the advisor and the dummy for frequent transactors and between the 
dummy for switching and the dummy for frequent transactors. An acquiring firm was classified as a frequent transactor if it had
four or more transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger. If the acquiring firm had less than four
transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger, it was classified as an infrequent transactor. 
Acquiring firms Acquiring firms Acquiring firms Total 
that chose that chose that chose
top tier middle tier bottom tier
advisors advisors advisors
Acquiring firms were infrequent transactors 114 132 142 388
Acquiring firms were frequent transactors 86 100 37 223
Total 200 232 179 611
Test for independence of dummy for frequent transactor and advisor tier
Value of c2 (2) Statistic = 27.36, pvalue = 0.00
Acquiring firms Acquiring firms Total 
that did not that did
switch switch
Acquiring firms were infrequent transactors 242 146 388
Acquiring firms were frequent transactors 172 51 223
Total 414 197 611
Test for independence of dummy for frequent transactor and dummy for switching
Value of c2 (1) Statistic = 14.12, pvalue = 0.00
Table 4 Panel C- Cross Tabulations
Estimates of OLS regressions to estimate the impact of switching on merger fees. The dependent variable is the log of the total
fees paid. Fixed effect dummies for the target's 2 digit SIC code and the year of announcement are included in the models but not
included in the table to conserve space. All variables relating to prior transactions and relationship with the investement bank use
a four year period prior to the announcement of the merger transaction. Coefficient estimates and their p-values are reported.
Standard errors include the White correction for heteroscedasticity.The switch dummy takes a value of 1 when the acquiring firm
chose a merger advisor with whom it had no prior relationship. An upward switch is one where the acquiring firm chose a
merger advisor that had a higher tier than its previous lead bank. A lateral switch is one where the acquiring firm chose a merger
advisor that had the same tier as its previous lead bank. A downward switch is one where the acquiring firm chose a merger advisor
that had a lower tier than its previous lead bank. 
Independent Variables
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept -3.642 0.000 -3.619 0.000 -3.656 0.000
Log transaction value 0.624 0.000 0.625 0.000 0.628 0.000
Duration 0.026 0.018 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.018
Tender offer dummy 0.273 0.000 0.273 0.001 0.279 0.000
Hostile bid dummy -0.056 0.671 -0.053 0.744 -0.051 0.699
Number of advisors 0.311 0.000 0.309 0.001 0.309 0.000
Top tier advisor dummy 0.418 0.000 0.366 0.000 0.385 0.000
Medium tier advisor dummy 0.308 0.000 0.282 0.004 0.302 0.000
Switch dummy -0.224 0.001
Switch to a top tier bank -0.135 0.251
Switch to a middle tier bank -0.234 0.028
Switch to a bottom tier bank -0.290 0.009
Upward switch -0.142 0.247
Lateral switch -0.218 0.006
Downward Switch -0.367 0.008
p value of overall regression 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 611 611.00 611
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 72.32% 72.27% 72.30%
Table 5 A - Effect of switching on merger fees
Model 4Model 1 Model 3
Dependent Variable is log of total merger fees
Estimates of OLS regressions to estimate the impact of switching on merger fees. The dependent variable is the  total fees paid as
a percentage of transaction value. Fixed effect dummies for the target's 2 digit SIC code and the year of announcement are
included in the models but not included in the table to conserve space. All variables relating to prior transactions and relationships
with the investement bank use a four year period prior to the announcement of the merger transaction. Coefficient estimates and
their p-values are reported. Standard errors include the White correction for heteroscedasticity.The switch dummy takes a value of
1 when the acquiring firm chose a merger advisor with whom it had no prior relationship. An upward switch is one where the
acquiring firm chose a merger advisor that had a higher tier than its previous lead bank. A lateral switch is one where the
acquiring firm chose a merger advisor that had the same tier as its previous lead bank. A downward switch is one where the
acquiring firm chose a merger advisor that had a lower tier than its previous lead bank. 
Independent Variables
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 3.254 0.000 3.277 0.000 3.241 0.000
Log transaction value -0.715 0.000 -0.718 0.000 -0.713 0.000
Square of log transaction value 0.038 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.038 0.000
Duration 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.004 0.022 0.003
Tender offer dummy 0.144 0.014 0.143 0.007 0.147 0.005
Hostile bid dummy -0.038 0.539 -0.035 0.735 -0.037 0.726
Number of advisors 0.112 0.018 0.110 0.057 0.112 0.053
Top tier advisor dummy 0.256 0.000 0.219 0.001 0.244 0.000
Medium tier advisor dummy 0.195 0.000 0.186 0.003 0.192 0.000
Switch dummy -0.133 0.001
Switch to a top tier bank -0.058 0.440
Switch to a middle tier bank -0.157 0.020
Switch to a bottom tier bank -0.171 0.016
Upward switch -0.117 0.162
Lateral switch -0.116 0.017
Downward Switch -0.231 0.011
p value of overall regression 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 611 611.00 611
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 46.83% 46.78% 46.84%
Table 5 B - Effect of switching on merger fees
Model 3Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable is merger fees as a percentage of transaction value
Estimates of Heckman's 2 stage least squares procedure to estimate the impact of switching investment banks on
merger fees. The first column represents the result of a probit regression using the switch dummy as the
dependent variable. This dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the acquiring firm retained a merger advisor with
whom it had no prior relationship.  The second model represents the second stage regression where the
dependent variable is the log of the total merger advisory fees paid. Fixed effect dummies for  target's 2-digit SIC
code and year of announcement are included in both the first and the second stage regressions but not reported
in the Table to conserve space. All variables relating to prior transactions and relationship with the investment
bank use a 4-year period prior to the merger transaction. Coefficient estimates and their p-values are reported.
Independent Variables
Dependent variable is Dependent variable is
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept -0.8427 0.0325 -3.7364 0.0000
Log transaction value 0.0078 0.8576 0.6268 0.0000
Duration 0.0514 0.0227 0.0228 0.0445
Tender offer dummy 0.3474 0.0285 0.2546 0.0016
Hostile bid dummy -0.0491 0.8725 -0.0573 0.7206
Number of advisors 0.0377 0.8285 0.3089 0.0004
Tier of advisor 0.0996 0.2435
Tier of lead bank 0.1655 0.0514
Dummy for frequent transactor -0.3349 0.0117
Top tier Advisor 0.4407 0.0000
Middle Tier Advisor 0.3209 0.0000
Mill's Ratio -0.1364 0.0003
p value of overall regression 0.00 0.00
Sample size 611 611
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 9.89% 72.33%
Table 6 A - Two stage least squares estimates for effect of switching on merger fees
log of total merger feeSwitch Dummy
First stage Probit model Second stage corrected regression
Estimates of Heckman's 2 stage least squares procedure to estimate the impact of switching investment banks on the merger fees.
The first column represents the result of a probit regression using the switching dummy as the dependent variable. This dummy
variable takes a value of 1 if the acquiring firm uses a merger advisor with whom it had no prior relationship. The second model 
represents the second stage regression where the dependent variable is the merger fee as a percentage of transaction value. 
Fixed effect dummies for  target's 2-digit SIC code and year of announcement are included in both the first and the second stage
regressions but not reported in the Table to conserve space. All variables relating to prior transactions and relationship with the
investment bank use a 4-year period prior to the merger transaction. Coefficient estimates and their p-values are reported.
Independent Variables
Dependent variable is Dependent variable is
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept -0.3496 0.6400 3.1765 0.0000
Log transaction value -0.2433 0.2283 -0.7056 0.0000
Square of Log transaction value 0.0213 0.2027 0.0374 0.0000
Duration 0.0490 0.0304 0.0198 0.0065
Tender offer dummy -0.0704 0.8186 -0.0389 0.7036
Hostile bid dummy 0.3652 0.0221 0.1325 0.0101
Number of advisors -0.0052 0.9769 0.1115 0.0484
Tier of advisor 0.0870 0.3124
Tier of lead bank 0.1655 0.0520
Dummy for frequent transactor -0.3613 0.0073
Top tier Advisor 0.2686 0.0000
Middle Tier Advisor 0.2023 0.0001
Mill's Ratio -0.0792 0.0011
p value of overall regression 0.00 0.00
Sample size 611 611
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 5.97% 46.80%
Table 6 B - Two stage least squares estimates for effect of switching on merger fees
merger fees as a percentage of transaction valueSwitch Dummy
First stage Probit model Second stage corrected regression
Estimates of OLS regressions to estimate the impact of relationship strength on merger fees. The dependent variable is the
log of the total merger fees. Fixed effect dummies for the target 2 digit SIC and the year of announcement are included in
the models but not included in the table to conserve space. All variables relating to prior transactions and relationship
with the investement bank use a four year period prior to the announcement of the merger transaction. Coefficient
estimates and their p-values are reported. Standard errors include the White Correction for heteroscedasticity. The
sub-sample used in this table consists of transactions where the acquiring firm did not switch, that is, transactions where
the acquiring firm chose a merger advisor with whom it has a prior relationship before the merger. 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept -3.7677 0.0000 -3.7753 0.0000 -3.6936 0.0000
Log transaction value 0.6110 0.0000 0.6126 0.0000 0.6105 0.0000
Duration 0.0296 0.0156 0.0299 0.0150 0.0297 0.0156
Tender offer dummy 0.2281 0.0119 0.2317 0.0122 0.2339 0.0109
Hostile bid dummy -0.0282 0.8631 -0.0312 0.8487 -0.0321 0.8446
Number of advisors 0.4001 0.0000 0.3988 0.0000 0.4030 0.0000
Top tier advisor dummy 0.4013 0.0001 0.4020 0.0001 0.3011 0.1996
Medium tier advisor dummy 0.3233 0.0019 0.3256 0.0020 0.2329 0.3743
Relationship strength 0.1757 0.1064
Relationship strength interacted with 0.1810 0.0965
infrequent transactor dummy
Relationship strength interacted with 0.1521 0.2849
frequent transactor dummy
Relationship strength interacted with 0.2143 0.1773
with top tier merger advisor dummy
Relationship strength interacted with 0.1965 0.3054
with middle tier merger advisor dummy
Relationship strength interacted with 0.0668 0.7936
with bottom tier merger advisor dummy
p value of overall regression 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 414 414 414
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 70.77% 70.71% 70.64%
Table 7 A- Effect of Relationship strength on merger fees
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable is log of total merger fees
Estimates of OLS regressions to estimate the impact of relationship strength on merger fees. The dependent variable is the
merger fees as a percentage of transaction value. Fixed effect dummies for the target 2 digit SIC and the year of
announcement are included in the models but not included in the table to conserve space. All variables relating to prior
transactions and relationship with the investement bank use a four year period prior to the announcement of the merger
transaction. Coefficient estimates and their p-values are reported. Standard errors include the White Correction for
heteroscedasticity. The sub-sample used in this table consists of transactions where the acquiring firm did not switch,
that is, transactions where the acquiring firm chose a merger advisor with whom it has a prior relationship before the merger
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 3.4946 0.0000 3.5066 0.0000 3.6838 0.0000
Log transaction value -0.8094 0.0000 -0.8175 0.0000 -0.8267 0.0000
Square of Log transaction value 0.0441 0.0000 0.0452 0.0000 0.0455 0.0000
Duration 0.0222 0.0476 0.0228 0.0419 0.0224 0.0508
Tender offer dummy 0.0880 0.1687 0.1002 0.1259 0.1009 0.1181
Hostile bid dummy 0.0155 0.8495 0.0051 0.9490 0.0087 0.9156
Number of advisors 0.1815 0.0001 0.1762 0.0002 0.1887 0.0001
Top tier advisor dummy 0.2538 0.0005 0.2575 0.0004 0.0335 0.8026
Medium tier advisor dummy 0.2234 0.0006 0.2322 0.0005 0.0701 0.5962
Relationship strength 0.0042 0.9466
Relationship strength interacted with 0.0228 0.7293
infrequent transactor dummy
Relationship strength interacted with -0.0738 0.2985
frequent transactor dummy
Relationship strength interacted with 0.1181 0.2664
with top tier merger advisor dummy
Relationship strength interacted with 0.0091 0.9200
with middle tier merger advisor dummy
Relationship strength interacted with -0.21 0.15
with bottom tier merger advisor dummy
p value of overall regression 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 414 414 414
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 51.41% 51.54% 51.59%
Table 7 B- Effect of Relationship strength on merger fees
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable is the merger fees as a percentage of transaction value
This table explores the robustness of the switching results to inclusion of other data points
such as transactions where the acquiring firm had no prior transactions, transactions where
the only role of the advisor was to provide a fariness opinion. All results include the White
correction for heteroscedasticity.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable is log of total merger fees
Subsample where Full sample
(include fairness opinion)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept -3.7287 0.0000 -3.6443 0.0000
Log transaction value 0.6389 0.0000 0.6235 0.0000
Duration 0.0205 0.0125 0.0199 0.0119
Tender offer dummy 0.2606 0.0001 0.2451 0.0002
Hostile bid dummy -0.0187 0.8656 -0.0172 0.8780
Number of advisors 0.3107 0.0000 0.3219 0.0000
Top tier advisor dummy 0.4388 0.0000 0.4642 0.0000
Medium tier advisor dummy 0.3387 0.0000 0.3740 0.0000
Switch dummy -0.2088 0.0016 -0.2126 0.0008
No Transaction Dummy -0.1037 0.1542 -0.1247 0.0740
Fairness opinion dummy -1.1155 0.0000
p value of overall regression 0.00 0.00
Sample size 755 817
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 75.04% 77.34%
prior transactions
acquiring firm had no
Table 8 A - Robustness checks
This table explores the robustness of the switching results to inclusion of other data points
such as transactions where the acquiring firm had no prior transactions, transactions where
the only role of the advisor was to provide a fariness opinion. All results include the White
correction for heteroscedasticity.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable is merger fees as percentage of
transaction value
Subsample where Full sample
(include fairness opinion)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 1.9713 0.0000 1.8733 0.0000
Log transaction value -0.2730 0.0000 -0.2424 0.0000
Square of Log transaction value 0.0024 0.2779 0.0001 0.4820
Duration 0.0178 0.0198 0.0165 0.0238
Tender offer dummy 0.1344 0.0135 0.1344 0.0106
Hostile bid dummy -0.0184 0.7539 -0.0236 0.6824
Number of advisors 0.1778 0.0001 0.1845 0.0000
Top tier advisor dummy 0.2284 0.0000 0.2201 0.0000
Medium tier advisor dummy 0.1680 0.0005 0.1572 0.0005
Switch dummy -0.1119 0.0099 -0.1132 0.0060
No Transaction Dummy 2.3938 0.2855 0.0522 0.5193
Fairness opinion dummy -0.4695 0.0000
p value of overall regression 0.00 0.00
Sample size 755 817
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 40.37% 41.54%
prior transactions
acquiring firm had no
Table 8 B- Robustness checks
This table examines the impact of switching on announcement returns of acquiring firms. The announcement returns
are calculated using a 11 day window (days -5 to +5) around the announcement date of the merger or tender offer.
Abnormal returns are calculated by estimating a market model from days -300 to -60 from the date of announcement.
Acquiring firms that did not have valid returns for these 240 days are excluded. This results in a sample of 564 transactions
which is then used to examine the impact of switching. 
Positive return Negative return Total
No switch 174 205 379
Switch 87 98 185
Total 76 69 564
Test for independence of switching and the sign of the return
Value of c2 (1) Statistic = 0.06, pvalue = 0.80
Mean Returns Median Returns
No switch -0.99% -0.84%
Switch -0.47% -0.63%
Total -0.82% -0.82%
t statistic for difference in mean -0.56
p value (one tail) 29%
Table 9 - Effect of switching on announcement returns
